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TEXT, INTENT, AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*

I.

THE VALAURI THESIS

John Valauri has reminded us of some things that bear frequent repetition.' The rhetoric of original intent is a favorite
tactic of a large political movement. This movement won the
last three Presidential elections, and it will probably appoint a
majority of the Supreme Court. Original intent arguments
invoke a strong logic and have a strong appeal to many people.
So it is worthwhile periodically to remind us of their difficulties
and vary the illustrations. Professor Valauri's paper does that.
But the problems he identifies are hardly news to constitutional lawyers, and I doubt that the jargon of hermeneutics
adds much to the conventional legal expression of the same difficulties. Many others have also noted his "horizontal" critique-the difficulties of identifying a single original intentand his "vertical" critique-the difficulties of applying that
intent to new questions and modern conditions. 2 These are
not the only problems with a jurisprudence of original intent,
but they are two of the most serious. As Valauri recognizes,'
the arguments on both sides are familiar and well developed.
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, The University of Texas
at Austin. I am grateful to Sanford Levinson, Frederick Schauer, and Jay
Westbrook for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Valauri, Everson v. Brown: Hermeneutics, Framers' Intent, and the
Establishment Clause, 4 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 661 (1990).
2. For a recent overview, see Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989). For other statements of the

difficulties of original intent, see, e.g., Balkin, ConstitutionalInterpretation and
the Problem of History (Book Review), 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (1988); Bennett,
Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 355
(1988); Bennett, Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984);
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204

(1980); Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L.J. 433 (1986); Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198-99, 1211-17 (1987);
Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously:A Theory ofJudicialReview (Book Review),

59 TEX. L.

REV. 343, 343-52 (1981); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation,79
MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Stevens, The Supreme Court of the United States:
Reflections After a Summer Recess, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 447 (1986).

3.

Valauri, supra note 1, at 662.

684

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

The point of his paper is that the richness of the general
debate on original intent has not been brought to bear on the
use of original intent in debate over the establishment clause.4
But he notes some exceptions in footnotes;5 his ultimate claim
is that the general debate has had less effect on the establishment clause than on other constitutional issues.
I doubt that religion clause debate is any more or less simplistic or intellectually dishonest than debate over other hotly
disputed constitutional issues. I doubt that the quality of
debate varies systematically across well-developed areas of constitutional law.
I do think that tactics vary by subject matter, responding to
the quantity and quality of evidence. The most common tactical pattern for original intent arguments is that one side says
the founders never thought the matter in dispute raised any
constitutional question, and certainly did not affirmatively
intend to make it unconstitutional, and so the political
branches can do what they think is right. The other side
responds that the evidence is unclear and times have changed,
that it is a Constitution we are expounding and we can't turn
back the clock, and in short, Justice Brennan must do what he
thinks is right.
I exaggerate only slightly, and for a purpose. There are
equal and opposite dangers here-to pretend that a simplistic
account of the founders' intent solves all our problems, or to
pretend that the text and history of the Constitution tell us very
little and constrain us not at all. Professor Valauri is plainly
alert to one of these dangers. If he is equally alert to the other,
then he and I do not disagree.
The typical pattern of argument about original intent has
been applied to religion clause issues. This was precisely the
argument in the legislative prayer case, where the majority
relied principally on the practices of the founders, and the dissenters said those practices were not controlling.6 A few
judges and commentators made similar arguments in the
debates over prayer and religious instruction in the public
schools.'
4. Id.
5. Id. at 662 n.6; 671 n.47.
6. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
7. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236-37 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("I doubt that [Madison and Jefferson's] view, even
if perfectly clear one way or the other, would supply a dispositive answer to
the question presented by these cases.... A too literal quest for the advice of
the Founding Fathers . . . seems to me futile and misdirected"); Fellman,
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But Valauri is right that the main line of establishment
clause debate has taken a different course, in which both sides
rely on original intent. Because there is an unusual abundance
of historical evidence, and because there is ample evidence to
support both sides, both sides appeal to history. Those who
would invalidate government action abandon their usual argument that original intent is not binding, and instead urge that
this time original intent is on their side. That tactical choice
tells you something about the perceived legitimacy and persuasive power of original intent arguments. Despite their many
problems, they have an almost irresistible appeal.
This tactical choice also creates Valauri's impression that
the establishment clause debate has ignored the larger literature on original intent. Because both sides rely on original
intent, there is less attention to its difficulties.' In the hands of
the unsophisticated, the result-oriented, or even those who are
honest and know better but are sometimes careless or tempted,
those difficulties get less attention than usual. We have all
sinned, and come short of full intellectual rigor. But the difficulties with original intent do not disappear from what we
know, and they have not disappeared entirely from the debate
over religious liberty.
We cannot invoke original intent in the simplistic way that
Valauri condemns, but neither can we ignore history. If we are
to get beyond broadsides for and against original intent, we
must identify criteria for better and worse kinds of historical
evidence and better and worse arguments from that evidence.
II.

TEXT OR INTENT

The persistent appeal of originalist arguments derives
from our commitment to the proposition that government officials derive theirjust powers from the consent of the governed.
Where do judges get the power to enforce their conceptions of
religious liberty against the political branches, and even against
the people legislating directly by referendum? That power
derives from critical votes that Americans cast in critical periods-in 1787-88 for Article III and the test oath clause, in
Separation of Church and State: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 427, 427-28
(it is "futile and pointless to inquire" into original intent); Kauper, Prayer,
Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1066 (1963)
(defending school prayer decision on ground of policy, and criticizing Court
for pretending that either text or intent required the result).
8. Valauri, supra note 1, at 662.
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1789-91 for the first amendment, and in 1866-68 for the fourteenth amendment.
But "originalism" is fatally ambiguous at best, affirmatively
misleading at worst. It conflates two quite different modes of
argument. Textual arguments appeal to the authority of the
constitutional text; intentionalist arguments appeal to the
authority of the founders' intent. (I use "founders" to include
both the framers and the ratifiers.) The founders voted on the
text, but each voter had some understanding of what the text
meant. Thus, both textual and intentionalist arguments appeal
to the authority of the votes that proposed and ratified the
Constitution.
Several scholars have elaborated the choice between text
and intent,9 and I will not review that whole analysis here. But
a brief excursion into text is prerequisite to anything I might
say about intent. The constitutional text has meaning as a matter of language, and that meaning depends only in part on the
founders' intent. The text is superior in authority to intent,
because only the text was submitted to the vote of the ratifiers.
I do not mean to claim that intent is irrelevant, but simply that
it is subordinate to the text.
In any event, we cannot directly know the intent of founders who are long dead. We must rely on indirect evidence,
and the text itself is the best evidence of intent. Extrinsic evidence of intent is secondary even with respect to intent; it is
much more attenuated as evidence of the meaning of the text.
We should examine the text first, and mine it for as much
meaning as it will yield, before turning to extrinsic evidence of
intent.
The most outspoken intentionalists invert these hierarchies of authority. They believe that intent controls text, and
that extrinsic evidence of intent controls textual evidence of
intent.'° Justice Scalia's position is especially puzzling; he con9. See, e.g., P. BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7, 9-38 (1982); Falion,
supra note 2, at 1195-99 (1987); Laycock, ConstitutionalTheory Matters, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 767, 774 (1987); Laycock, supra note 2, at 343-52; Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Powell,
ConstitutionalLaw as Though the Constitution Mattered (Book Review), 1986 DUKE
L.J. 915; Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1427 (1986); Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29
UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982). Philip Bobbitt draws a more radical distinction
between text and intent than most of the other scholars cited in this footnote.
In his view, textual arguments do not draw legitimacy from the votes of the
founders.
THE
GOVERNMENT
BY
JUDICIARY:
10. See, e.g.,
R.
BERGER,
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 6 (1977) ("the intention
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sistently insists that the Court must construe the statutory text
and not Congressional intent," but in constitutional interpretation he apparently reverses himself,
demanding exhaustive
2
attention to constitutional history.1
Interpreters who emphasize extrinsic evidence of the founders' intent tend to ignore the generality of the text and to substitute much narrower conceptions of intent. The founders
focused on the specific problems most salient to their lives, but
they cons titutionalized general principles that seem designed
to cover whole classes of similar problems. What they left a
record of having specifically and consciously intended is often a
small subset of the text they proposed and ratified. Interpretation limited to specific and provable intentions thus tends to be
fatally inconsistent with the constitutional text.
This inconsistency is a third reason to be skeptical of
straightforward reliance on extrinsic evidence of original
intent, and especially of claims about quite specific intentions.
In my judgment, this argument is even more important than
Professor Valauri's horizontal and vertical critiques.
The primacy of text is relevant to the meaning of the religion clauses. First, the word "exercise" is powerful textual evidence that the protection extends beyond mere belief and
reaches religious conduct.
of the framers being unmistakably expressed, that intention is as good as
written into the text"); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (1971) ("The words are general but surely that

would not permit us to escape the framers' intent if it were clear"); Bork,
Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 394 (1985) ("the source [of
constitutional liberties] was the intent of the framers and ratifiers, and that
was to be discerned from text, history, structure, and precedent");
Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 92 ("History

lays down the baseline against which other arguments are measured");
Graglia, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?-The Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 88 (1989)

(text of fourteenth amendment conceals its intended purpose, and purpose
controls).

11.

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2296 (1989)

(Scalia,J., concurring in part) (Court's task is not "to plumb the intent of the

particular Congress that enacted a particular provision ... but rather to give
fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code"); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (joining Court's opinion except insofar as it relies on legislative
history); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (same).
12. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57
(1989) (constitutional interpretation "requires the consideration of an
enormous mass of material [and] immersing oneself in the political and
intellectual atmosphere of the time").

688

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF IA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

Second, the text of the religion clauses is absolute. It says
"no law," not "no unreasonable law," or "no badly motivated
law." We have learned that we cannot literally enforce the
absolutism of the first amendment, but neither should we
ignore it. Implied exceptions to a textually absolute constitutional right should be an extraordinary thing; the Supreme
Court's recent free exercise jurisprudence implies exceptions
far too readily
and gives insufficient weight to the absoluteness
3
of the text.'
Third, some of the strongest evidence that the establishment clause precludes nonpreferential aid to religion is partly
textual. As I have explained in more detail elsewhere, 4 the
Senate and the Conference Committee considered and rejected
four drafts of the establishment clause that were expressly and
unambiguously nonpreferentialist. Congress instead proposed
to the states one of the most sweeping drafts considered by
either House. That draft was ratified. The clause forbids any
law respecting an establishment of religion, and the stark contrast with the rejected drafts greatly strengthens the textual
inference that the unmodified word "religion" refers to religion generically.
This argument goes beyond the ratified text, but it looks to
actual votes on proposed text and not to more remote evidence
of what was in the heads of the founders. I will further explore
the strengths and weaknesses of
this intermediate form of argu5
ment in a subsequent paper.'
III.

THE USES OF HISTORY

Once we go beyond the text to extrinsic evidence of intent,
some evidence is more valuable than other evidence, and there
are better and worse ways to argue from it. Intentionalist arguments must be alert to all the dangers highlighted by the vari13.

See, e.g.,

O'Lone v.

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.

342 (1987)

(upholding prison's refusal to bring Muslim prisoners to religious service
within the same prison); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(upholding military rules forbidding the wearing of yarmulkes with uniform);
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (upholding
revocation of tax exemption of pervasively religious university that
prohibited interracial dating among its students).
14. Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 879-83 (1986).
15.
LIBERTY:

Laycock, Original Intent and the Constitution Today, in THE FIRST
THE

BICENTENNIAL

OF THE

FIRST AMENDMENT

(J. Wood ed.)

(forthcoming). I underestimated the difficulties in my initial elaboration of
this argument. See Laycock, supra note 14, at 883-84 n.4 7 .
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ous critiques-to Valauri's horizontal and vertical critiques
and to the gap between broad text and specific intent.
The common search for evidence of what the founders
thought about the specific issue before the Court is vulnerable
on all three grounds. When we pose the question at that level
of specificity, we maximize the horizontal problems of finding
evidence of what the founders thought and of summing the
thoughts of all the members of the twenty-eight legislative bodies entitled to vote on the first amendment.' 6 We maximize the
vertical problem of applying their intent to modern conditions,
because the focus on the specific practice tends to exclude consideration of changes in context. And we maximize the gap
between text and other evidence of intent, because to pose the
question in this way conceives intent at a level of generality far
narrower than the language of the text.
An intent known to be widely held, or at least widely
known, is more important than the isolated quotation so common to law office history. The isolated quotation, even from a
Madison or a Hamilton, is maximally vulnerable to Valauri's
horizontal critique.
An intent that was consciously subjected to constitutional
scrutiny is more valuable than an intent or a practice that was
not so examined. The unexamined continuation of a practice
may reflect momentum, oversight, or failure of anyone to raise
the issue, and almost certainly does not reflect a considered
intent about the meaning of the Constitution. For similar reasons, constitutional scrutiny under the pressure of a real complaint from a significant minority that felt unfairly treated is
more valuable than a hypothetical constitutional analysis of a
practice that was largely uncontroversial in the social context of
the times.
The unexamined intent is especially vulnerable to
Valauri's vertical critique: a practice might have been harmless
and therefore unexamined in the founders' time, but now,
16. These were the two Houses of Congress, the two houses of the
bicameral legislatures in twelve of the original thirteen states, and the
unicameral legislatures in Pennsylvania and Vermont. For the ratifying states

and the dates of ratification, see Historical Notes to U.S. Const., amend. I, in
U.S.C.A. Pennsylvania ratified on March 10, 1790. Its Constitution of 1790,
creating a bicameral legislature, was adopted on September 2 and took effect
on December 7. See R. BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL
19-20 (1960); B. KONKLE, GEORGE BRYAN AND THE
DEVELOPMENT

1731-1791, at 353-54 (1922). Vermont
retained its unicameral legislature until 1836. See J. FORDHAM, THE STATE
CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION 27-28

(1959).
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because of changed social conditions, it may cause serious
harm of a kind closely analogous to the harms they sought to
avoid. An example is government religious observances of
generic Protestant theology and liturgy.
The best non-textual evidence of intent is a widely debated
social or political problem that a constitutional clause was
intended to solve or ameliorate, considered in light of its contemporary social context. We read the equal protection clause
in light of the history of slavery and of race relations in the
immediate aftermath of emancipation. Similarly, we should
read the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures in light of the pre-revolutionary controversy over general searches and writs of assistance, 7 and the
contract clause in light of the controversy over debtor relief
legislation in the 1780s. 8
These controversies were widely known, widely debated,
and consciously examined under political pressure that made
the debate real and not just academic. They identify the core
target of the resulting constitutional right. Interpreters can
then search for a coherent principle, consistent with the text
and as broad as the text, that centers on the core problem that
the text was intended to resolve. An interpretation that would
leave the core problem unresolved, or even marginal to the
clause, is nearly as indefensible as an interpretation that is
inconsistent with the text.
Because the best evidence of intent arises from major controversies, we should not expect to find a consensus that unites
both supporters and opponents of a constitutional provision,
or even a fully consistent view of all related issues among the
supporters. The attitudes that give rise to the losing side of a
controversy do not instantly disappear. It would be extraordinarily naive to expect that racist attitudes and racist practices
suddenly disappeared in 1868, and it would be mistaken to
assume that because they survived, the equal protection clause
permits government to act on them. It would be equally naive
17.

See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-26 (1886); T.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 301-03 (1868); T. TAYLOR, Two
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 29-44 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 42728 (1934); id. at 454-65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); The Federalist, No. 7
(Hamilton) at 65 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 44 (Madison) at 282-83; C.
COOLEY,

BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

178-81 (1913); R. MORRIS, THE FORGING OFTHE UNION, 1781-1789, at
154-59 (1987); B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-6
(1938).
STATES
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to think that all vestiges of religious establishment and religious intolerance instantly disappeared when the religion
clauses were ratified, or that their survival fixes the meaning of
the religion clauses.
IV.
A.

HISTORY AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES

The History of Religious Persecution

The religion clauses had two great defining controversies.
One was the long history of religious persecution and civil and
international religious wars in Western societies. For two hundred years after the Reformation, religious conflict was a major
factor in European politics in general and English politics in
particular. 9 English highlights included Henry VIII's break
with Rome; the Catholic succession of Mary; the Protestant succession of Elizabeth I; a Catholic heir-apparent through the
first thirty years of Elizabeth's reign, until the execution of
Mary Queen of Scots; the unsuccessful invasion of the Spanish
Armada; the Civil War among Anglican Royalists, Puritan Parliamentarians, and Presbyterians allied with the Scots; the
renewed fears of a Catholic succession, culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which replaced James II with William
of Orange; and the endless problems of English rule in Catholic Ireland.
Religious conflicts were carried to the English colonies in
America, and took new form with the growth of new denominations. Minor persecutions of Baptists and Quakers continued
sporadically into the political lives of the founders.2" Catholics
were rare outside Maryland, but the virulent anti-Catholicism
of post-Reformation England appears to have been alive and
well in the founders' generation. 2 '
19. See generally G. MATTINGLY, THE ARMADA (1959); THE OXFORD
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRITAIN 237-359 (K. Morgan ed. 1983); L. SEAMAN,
A NEW HISTORY OF ENGLAND 191-301 (1981); A. TUCKER, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH CIVILIZATION 259-373 (1972).
20. See D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 136

(1958) ("nearly fifty" Baptist ministers in Virginia jailed between 1768 and

1776); T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 168 (1986) (seizure of property from
Massachusetts Baptists for unpaid church taxes); THE COMPLETE MADISON

298 (S. Padover, ed. 1953) (Letter from Madison to William Bradford, Jan.
24, 1774, complaining that "5 or 6 well meaning men" were then in jail "for
publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox");
see also D. BOORSTIN, supra, at 35-40 (early colonial persecutions of Quakers).

21.

See examples collected in Laycock, supra note 14, at 916, 918. See

also D. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST MOVEMENTS TO THE NEW
RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12-22 (1988) (reviewing efforts to suppress
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Despite these remnants, the fight over religious persecution was more historical than contemporary. There was no significant sentiment for persecution among the founders.
Everyone subscribed to tolerance, at least for Protestants, and
vestiges such as test oaths and tax supported churches were
defended as consistent with tolerance. 2 2 But the history of serious religious conflict was recent and salient, and its broad outlines were widely known. The history of post-Reformation
religious conflict was more recent to the founders than the history of slavery is to us. It is surely reasonable to infer that the
founders intended the religion clauses of state and federal constitutions to prevent a renewal of these conflicts.
From that point we may reason further about what is necessarily entailed in that intent. What can we learn from the history of these religious conflicts that is relevant to the
interpretation of the religion clauses? One thing we learn is
that some humans are willing to die for religion, and that some
are willing to kill for it. Because most Americans cannot imagine doing either, we find it hard to take seriously the uncompromising beliefs of religious minorities. We find exasperated
23
judges demanding that religious minorities be reasonable.
But the religion clauses exist in substantial part because believers are not always reasonable, and may be fanatical. The religion clauses must protect unusually intense religious
commitments, just as they protect the rest of us from those who
are so committed. Attempts to bend religious conscience to
the will of the state can lead to suffering and persecution.
We can describe such an argument as intentionalist,
because of its connection to what we have inferred about the
intent of the founders. But such arguments come from our
overt anti-Catholicism during Revolution, to help unite against common

enemy).
22. For an excellent treatment of the test oath controversy, see
Gaustad, Religion and Ratification, inJ. WooD, supra note 15. For a sampling of

the arguments in favor of tax supported churches, see T. CURRY, supra note
20, at 131-32, 217.
23. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Industries, 829 F.2d 519, 521-22 (4th Cir.

1987) (employee's "uncompromising and adamant refusal to work on Sunday
. [and] his own absolutist position.., precluded [employer] from making a
reasonable accommodation for his religious practices"), vacated en banc, 849
F.2d 116 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 306 (1988); In re Reynolds, 83
Bankr. 684, 685 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (unreasonable for debtors in bankruptcy to
give more than three percent of gross income to church); In re Gaulker, 63
Bankr. 224, 226 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) ("it seems a quite stern and uncaring
religion" that would require such large contributions from debtors in
bankruptcy).
.
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own heads and not from any surviving record of what was in
the heads of the founders. What we get from the founders is
the broad contours of principle: do not prohibit the free exercise of religion, do not do anything respecting an establishment
of religion, construe these rules in a way that avoids religious
persecution and conflict of the sort that followed the Reformation. It is modern Americans, and not the founders, who must
draw the lessons from past persecutions and apply those lessons to current conditions. And because it is we who are drawing the lessons, we can also learn from the post-founding
persecutions of Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and contemporary "cults."
This allocation of responsibility is even clearer when we
recognize that the founders' general intent may require rejection of some of their unexamined but more specific intentions.
The persistence of anti-Catholicism through the framing of the
religion clauses was like the persistence of racism through the
framing of the fourteenth amendment. We cannot reconcile it
with any principled understanding of the religion clauses, and
we should not try to do so.
Rejection of the founders' anti-Catholicism is possible only
because their intent is subordinate to the text. The founders'
views on slavery were even more inconsistent with the larger
purposes of the Constitution than their views on Catholics. But
they wrote their views on slavery into the ratified text, and so
we were stuck with them until they could be eliminated by constitutional amendment. If they had written their anti-Catholicism into the text, we would be equally stuck. But they did not.
I have suggested elsewhere that we are not bound by the
government's public observance of Protestantism in the founders' time. 4 That too reflects an intent not written into the
text, unexamined because uncontroversial in a nation with
hardly any non-Protestants, in tension with the broad principles of the text as applied to our more pluralistic time, and a
product of the same causes that fueled more overt anti-Catholicism. The case against overt government anti-Catholicism is
obviously stronger than the case against government religious
observances, because the tension with principled understandings of the text is so much sharper. But if we conclude that
government-sponsored religious observances in our time tend
to secularize religion, offend religious minorities and denigrate
their status in the polity, and offend many of the most serious
believers among the religious majority, then there is ample
24.

Laycock, supra note 14, at 913-19.
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basis in textual and other modes of constitutional argument to
override the weak argument from unexamined intent.
B.

Disestablishment in the States

The second great defining controversy for the religion
clauses was the fight over disestablishment in the states. That
-fight has been chronicled in recent books, 2 5 and I have
examined its implications for the federal establishment clause
in my earlier work.2 6 It is sufficient here to note two things.
First, taxation to support religion is at the core of what the
opponents of establishment sought to prevent.2 7
Second, the defenders of establishment everywhere
adopted the defensive strategy of nonpreferentialism. In New
England, the attempts to be nonpreferential were transparently
unsuccessful. The systems favored the Congregationalists,
they were the source of bitter religious strife, and they were
eliminated shortly after the framing. They were vestiges of the
old regime, not models for the new. 28 In Virginia and Maryland, the proposals for a general assessment were as nonpreferential as eighteenth century Americans could conceive, and
after much debate, they were voted down.2 9
These state controversies are not part of the legislative history of the federal establishment clause. But they are part of
the intellectual and social history of what "establishment"
meant to the founders' generation. And because they are so
focused on a theory that continues to be proposed, they are
much better evidence of intent than we usually get. We can say
with fewer qualifications than usual that the founders rejected
nonpreferentialism as the solution to the problem of religious
establishment. And we can even more confidently reject the
contrary position: whatever else they may have intended, it is
historical nonsense to claim that the founders affirmatively and
specifically intended to permit government to aid religion on
condition that it do so nonpreferentially.
There remains the vertical problem of applying this conclusion to changed conditions and changed questions. In this
25. T. CURRY, supra note 20; L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). For a more detailed account of
the debates in Virginia, see T. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA,

1776-1787 (1977).

26. Laycock, supra note 14, at 894-902.
27. Compare id. at 895-902 (debates over taxation to support churches)
with id. at 913-19 (uncontroversial nonfinancial aid to religion).
28. See id. at 900-02.
29. See id. at 895-99.
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case, changed conditions strengthen the case against nonpreferentialism. The vast increase in religious pluralism makes
nonpreferentialism even less practical today than in the eighteenth century.
But changed conditions have also posed new questions,
and the answers of the 1780s are nonresponsive. The question
in Everson v. Board of Education3 0 was not whether government
can aid religion financially, or whether it can aid religion nonpreferentially. The question in Everson was whether the bus
rides were aid to religion. On that question, the debates of the
1780s have nothing to say. Earmarked taxes to pay ministers
and build churches are unquestionably aid. In the modern
social welfare state, it is very much harder to decide which government services are forbidden aid and which government
services must be given to avoid discriminating against religion.
The most significant evidence of the founders' intent with
respect to these questions is that they paid for missionaries to
teach the Indians. 3 1 Thus, despite their hostility to financial aid
to churches, they apparently saw no problem in paying
churches to deliver educational and social services. Even Jefferson participated in this practice. 3 2 The practice continued
steadily for a hundred years. On the other hand, it was uncontroversial and unexamined, and it was ended when a later generation subjected it to establishment clause scrutiny. 3 This
unexamined practice is weak evidence for the claim that the
founders specifically intended to permit government to pay
churches to deliver educational and social services. But it is
strong evidence against the claim that they specifically intended
to forbid such payments. The arguments for and against aid to
church-run schools,34 social welfare programs,35 or chastity
counselling3 6 do not turn on anything specific in the intent of
the founders.
Twice now I have distinguished a proposition from its converse. I said there is strong evidence that the founders
opposed nonpreferential establishments, and overwhelming
30.
31.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION 53-80, 261-70 (1982).
32. Id. at 261-63.
33. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62.
34. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983).
35. See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
36. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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evidence that they did not specifically intend to permit them. I
said there is weak evidence that the founders intended to permit government to pay for social services delivered through
churches, and strong evidence that they did not intend to forbid it.
These distinctions turn on the common understanding
that those who assert a claim bear the burden of persuasion. It
is always easier to show what the founders did not intend than
to show what they intended. Beware of arguments from false
alternatives: when someone shows that the founders did not
intend p, he has not shown that they did intend not p. There
may be a third alternative, in between or simply different, or
there might have been such an alternative in 1791, or the founders might have mistakenly thought there was such an alternative. Or the founders might not have thought much about
either p or not p.
In this formulation, p may be any proposition about the
meaning of the Constitution, or about the constitutionality of
any government act. For example, consider a state plan to
finance education with tuition vouchers that could be used at
any public or private school, including religious schools. If I
show that the founders did not intend to forbid education
vouchers, I have not thereby shown that the founders affirmatively intended to permit them. Similarly, if I show that the
founders did not affirmatively intend to permit vouchers, I have
not thereby shown that the founders did intend to forbid them.
It is entirely possible that the founders never thought about
education vouchers, and that they never thought about anything sufficiently analogous to justify an inference of intent one
way or the other.
Cases with respect to which the founders had no knowable
intent are not merely possible; they are common. They are not
a cause for despair. We still have the primary source of constitutional law, which is the constitutional text. We are still capable of elaborating that text in a principled way. The text is
primary even when there is secondary evidence of intent. The
absence of such secondary evidence is, quite literally, a problem of secondary importance.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional interpretation requires the identification of
coherent principles in the constitutional text, reasoned elaboration of the implications of those principles, and application of
the principles, including their implications, to current condi-
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tions. History can help in that task, but only if it is done right.
It is nearly always helpful to ask what problem the founders
were trying to solve; it is rarely helpful to ask how the founders
would have decided a particular case on today's docket. And
all inferences from history must be checked against the primary
authority of the text.

